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Pension Scheme Redesign and Wealth Redistribution Between the Members and Sponsor: 
The USS Rule Change in October 2011 
 
  
 
 ABSTRACT 
The redesign of defined benefit pension schemes usually results in a substantial redistribution of 
wealth between age cohorts of members, pensioners, and the sponsor. This is the first study to 
quantify the redistributive effects of a rule change by a real world scheme (the Universities 
Superannuation Scheme, USS) where the sponsor underwrites the pension promise. In October 
2011 USS closed its final salary scheme to new members, opened a career average revalued 
earnings (CARE) section, and moved to ‘cap and share’ contribution rates. We find that the pre-
October 2011 scheme was not viable in the long run, while the post-October 2011 scheme is 
probably viable in the long run, but faces medium term problems. In October 2011 future 
members of USS lost 65% of their pension wealth (or roughly £100,000 per head), equivalent to 
a reduction of roughly 11% in their total compensation, while those aged over 57 years lost 
almost nothing. The riskiness of the pension wealth of future members increased by a third, while 
the riskiness of the present value of the sponsor’s future contributions reduced by 10%. Finally, 
the sponsor’s wealth increased by about £32.5 billion, equivalent to a reduction of 26% in their  
pension costs.  
 
 
 
Key words: Defined benefit, Pension scheme, Redistribution, USS, Scheme design, Risk shifting, 
Risk management 
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On retirement the sponsor of a UK defined benefit (DB) pension scheme promises to pay a 
pension according to the rules of the scheme, regardless of the scheme’s financial state. This 
appears to place all the risks (investment, interest rates, inflation, salaries, longevity, regulation, 
etc.) on the sponsor, who is usually the employer. But the sponsor can share these risks with 
active and future members of the scheme by altering the rules applying to future accruals. For 
example, a large deficit may lead to rule changes such as an increase in the members’ 
contribution rate, the introduction of limited price indexation, a later retirement age, or a 
reduction in the accrual rate. Because UK law does not allow accrued benefits to be reduced, rule 
changes only apply to future accruals. This means that the youngest scheme members are the 
hardest hit by such action as they will be accruing benefits under the new rules for many years, 
while those near retirement are largely unaffected since their substantial accrued benefits are 
legally protected. 
 
Before a rule change the various scheme participants have both accrued benefits and expectations 
of the net present value (NPV) of their future interactions with the scheme, i.e. contributions to be 
made and pensions to be received
1
. After a rule change these expectations are altered, and the 
difference between NPVs of the cash flows before and after the rule change for each age cohort 
quantifies the redistributive effect of the rule change. For example, an increase in the member 
contribution rate redistributes pension wealth from active and future members to the sponsor. 
Therefore a rule change leads to the redistribution of pension wealth and risk between the main 
groups of participant - the sponsor, active members, deferred members
2
, pensioners and future 
members. 
 
When rule changes are proposed, attention usually focusses on the details of these changes such 
as contribution rates, accrual rates and retirement ages, but with no detailed valuation of the size 
of the wealth transfer. Almost no explicit consideration is given to the effects of a rule change on 
the wealth of the different age cohorts, or to the riskiness of this wealth, and these can be 
substantial. Therefore an important objective of this paper is to stimulate a greater awareness of 
the redistributive effects on wealth and risk of pension scheme redesign, particularly the 
                                                 
1
 The resulting changes in cash flows between the members and sponsor are zero sum. 
2
 Members who are no longer active contributors, but who have not yet retired. 
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generational effects. While this paper deals with a particular pension scheme and rule change, the 
methodology can be applied to investigate the redistributive effects of rule changes by other DB 
schemes where the sponsor remains responsible for meeting the pension promise, as in countries 
such as the UK and USA. It can also be used to investigate the long run viability of such DB 
pension schemes. 
 
Previous investigations of the redistribution of pension wealth by rule changes have been of 
hypothetical schemes. This is the first paper to quantify the redistributive effects of a major 
package of rule changes by a large real-world DB pension scheme - the UK Universities 
Superannuation Scheme (USS). Almost all previous studies have been of hypothetical Dutch 
schemes where the sponsor has no obligation beyond paying a fixed contribution rate. Therefore 
the sponsor is not involved, and all the redistribution is between different generations of member, 
i.e. inter-generational redistribution. In 2011 USS was a ‘balance of cost’ scheme where, unlike 
Dutch schemes, the sponsor bears the default risk, and so any redistribution of wealth and risk is 
primarily between the sponsor and members. 
 
To quantify redistribution stemming from the October 2011 rule change, a benchmark must be 
specified. One possible benchmark is to compute the ‘true’ funding position of USS in October 
2011, and then to distribute any deficit among the sponsor and the cohorts of members and 
pensioners. However, there would be a considerable degree of uncertainty and subjectivity 
attached to such a benchmark. In October 2011 USS had a well-defined set of rules, the main 
features of which had remained unchanged since 1975, when USS began. Therefore a reasonable 
expectation for members in October 2011 was that the pension promises enshrined in the USS 
rules would be honoured, and so the benchmark we use is the pre-October 2011 scheme. 
 
This paper incorporates many aspects of the problem not included in previous studies - lump sum 
payments on retirement, deferred pensioners, limited price indexation, spouses’ pensions, 
increases in the retirement date, both final salary and career revalued benefits (CRB) sections, 
and consumer price indexation (CPI) of the accrued benefits of the CRB section active members 
and the accrued benefits of deferred pensioners, as well as pensions in payment. In addition, we 
compute final salaries using the retail price index (RPI), see Appendix A. This is also the first 
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study of redistribution by a scheme moving to ‘cap and share’ contribution rates. We model the 
pension scheme for longer than a working lifetime to avoid the problem of back-loading, where 
contributions made when young represent worse value than those made when old
3
. If the effects 
of a rule change are quantified for a period shorter than a working lifetime, the presence of back-
loading is likely to show that the young receive a less favourable outcome than the old. We also 
employ a dynamic asset allocation strategy by allowing the asset allocation to respond to the 
current funding ratio (assets/liabilities), rather than use a fix-mix investment strategy as have 
most previous studies. With 13 factors the vector auto-regression (VAR) model we use to 
forecast asset returns and inflation includes many more assets than previous studies, and is only 
the second study to include the three factors of the yield curve (level, slope and curvature) in the 
VAR model, rather than selected interest rates. Finally, we model the numbers of new active and 
deferred scheme members each year as stochastic processes. 
 
Section 1 describes USS, and section 2 outlines our methodology. Section 3 has a literature 
review, followed in section 4 by details of the data and methodology used to forecast the yield 
curve, asset returns, inflation and academic salaries each period until the horizon date. Section 5 
contains the procedure for forecasting the size of each age cohort, and section 6 explains how the 
liabilities (i.e. the accrued benefits) of each age cohort are estimated at the end of each period. 
Section 7 then brings together all these forecasts to calculate the triennial values of the USS 
funding ratio, revisions to the member and sponsor contribution rates, and adjustments to the 
asset allocation. In section 8 these are used to generate the cash flows to and from the various 
participants each time period until the horizon date. The NPVs of these cash flows are valued 
using stochastic discount factors (SDF) to give the redistribution of wealth generated by the 
October 2011 rule changes. The results appear in section 9, with robustness checks in section 10, 
where the use of riskless discount rates also permits estimates of the changes in risk
4
. Finally, 
section 11 has the conclusions. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Back-loading occurs when the scheme uses age-independent contribution and accrual rates (as 
does USS) and the rate of return on the scheme’s assets exceeds the rate of salary growth. 
4
 It is not possible to use SDFs to measure changes in risk. 
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1. USS 
In 2014 USS was the second largest pension scheme in the UK, and the 36
th
 largest in the world 
with 316,440 active members, deferred pensioners and pensioners. It is a multi-employer scheme 
with 374 separate sponsors (or institutions), and assets valued at £42 billion in 2014. Until the 
rule change implemented in October 2011, USS was an open final salary scheme. In October 
2011 USS was split into two sections - a final salary section that was closed to new members in 
October 2011, and a CRB section, which operates on a career average revalued earnings (CARE) 
basis, and started operation in October 2011. The rule changes in October 2011 were a matter of 
heated public controversy between the institutional sponsors of USS, represented by the 
Employers Pension Forum; and the members and pensioners of USS, represented by the 
University and College Union (UCU), leading to lengthy industrial action by members of the 
UCU
5
.  
 
USS is a very large and complicated scheme with a 295 page rule book, and so any model of USS 
is bound to be a gross simplification. This study captures the financially important features of 
USS, including all the rules that changed. The other important changes implemented in October 
2011, besides new members joining the CRB section, were (a) an increase in the contribution rate 
for the final salary section, (b) the introduction of a ‘cap and share’ rule for deficits and surpluses, 
(c) linking the normal retirement age to the state pension age, and (d) limiting the indexation of 
pensions and deferred pensions. The rules pre and post-October 2011 are set out in Appendix A. 
This appendix also details some of the other USS rules incorporated in our model, including lump 
sum payments, spouses’ pensions, deferred pensioners, and the computation of final salary. 
Unchanged rules tend to be less important because they have a similar effect on pension wealth 
before and after the rule change, and so tend not to create redistribution.  
 
2. Methodology 
We modelled the effects of the six rule changes as a single package, rather than examining the 
effects of each rule change separately. This is because we are primarily interested in the effects of 
the package, the rule changes interact and so the effects of the October 2011 rule changes are 
only available by treating them as a package, and because repeating the analysis another six  
                                                 
5
 No explicit concerns were expressed for the distributional implications of the rule change. 
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times would be a considerable undertaking. The analysis of the redistributive effects of the USS 
rules change in October 2011 is divided into two main steps. The first step is to model the 
evolution of USS over the horizon period, permitting forecasts of the cash flows between each 
age cohort, the sponsors and USS under two alternative sets of rules - those pre and post-October 
2011. This will be done using three year time periods, as this is the frequency of USS actuarial 
valuations and contribution rate reviews. In the second step, the NPV of the forecast cash flows 
for each age cohort and the sponsors is computed for both the pre and post-October 2011 rules. 
This allows the calculation of the NPV of the change in expected pension wealth for each cohort 
caused by the October 2011 rule changes, which is the standard way of measuring pension 
redistribution, Bonenkamp (2009). 
 
We concentrate on expected pension wealth, although the October 2011 rule change may well 
have other effects on members and the sponsor. Pension contributions are an important 
component of university expenditure. Since the government no longer raises university funding to 
compensate for increases in the cost of USS, any additional sponsor contributions must be funded 
by the universities themselves. Apart from raising additional revenue, universities might make 
cost savings by cutting expenditure on capital projects, reducing salaries or increasing workloads, 
with an adverse effect on active members. It is also possible that after October 2011 employers 
used their reduction in pension contributions, relative to the benchmark, to raise salaries to 
compensate for the drop in expected pension wealth of members. Many empirical studies have 
tried to quantify the compensating wage differential, i.e. the size of the trade-off between pension 
benefits and wages, and recent examples of this literature include Disney, Emmerson and Tetlow 
(2009), Gerakos (2010) and Haynes and Sessions (2013). Attempts to quantify the wage-pension 
trade-off have encountered substantial econometric and data problems (Allen and Clark, 1987), 
but subject to these reservations, the empirical evidence suggests the trade-off is well below one-
for-one. Consistent with this evidence UK academic salaries have showed no obvious response to 
the USS rule change of October 2011
6
. Such consequential effects on the membership such as 
higher or lower salaries, worse conditions of service etc. are outside the scope of this research. 
 
                                                 
6
 Between October 2011 and October 2015 academic salary scales rose by only about 1% per 
year. 
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The members, future members, pensioners and deferred pensioners of the two sections of USS 
(final salary and CRB) are disaggregated into age-based cohorts, where the age range covered by 
each cohort is five years. We use five years because this is the period used by USS when they 
supplied us with some cohort data, and provides computational tractability. For the post-October 
2011 final salary section there are eight cohorts each of active members and deferred pensioners 
aged between 25 and 65 years, and six cohorts of pensioners aged between 65 and 95. In addition, 
the post-October 2011 CRB section has three cohorts of actives and deferreds aged between 25 
and 35 years. This is because new active members (future cohorts) enter directly into the four 
youngest cohorts each year. The post-October 2011 CRB section also has 11 cohorts of both 
future actives and deferreds aged from minus 30 to 25 years of age in 2011. This makes a total of 
50 cohorts for the post-October 2011 scheme. The continuation of an unchanged pre-October 
2011 final salary scheme has a total of 44 cohorts, all of which appear as part of the 50 post-
October 2011 scheme cohorts. The other participants in the scheme are the sponsors of USS, i.e. 
the 374 UK universities and related institutions, who are treated as a single group. 
 
Forecasting asset returns, yield curves, inflation, longevity and salaries for the horizon period (54 
years) is a daunting task; as is projecting the membership in each USS age cohort during this 
period. Therefore the resulting cash flow forecasts are inevitably subject to a considerable degree 
of estimation risk. Because of the heroic forecasts required, a range of financial and demographic 
forecasts are employed to generate a distribution of outcomes, and the sensitivity of the 
conclusions to some of the important assumptions is investigated as a robustness check. 
 
3. Literature Review 
In 2001 Chapman, Gordon and Speed suggested taking a much wider view of the effects of 
changes in pension scheme rules than had previously been the case. They identified six 
stakeholders who are affected by a change in pension scheme rules - the sponsor’s shareholders, 
the sponsor’s debt holders, the employees, externals (the sponsor’s suppliers and customers), 
consultants and advisors, and the government. For a hypothetical UK scheme, they simulated the 
cash flows between these six stakeholders over a ten year period, and then used SDFs to compute 
the NPV of the cash flows for each stakeholder. This was done for both a base case and various 
alternative pension rules, and the average NPV for each set of rules for each group of 
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stakeholders computed. The changes in these averages gave the redistributive effects of the rule 
change on the wealth of each stakeholder group.  
 
Ponds (2003) proposed using the approach of Chapman, Gordon and Speed (2001) to quantify the 
intergenerational redistributive effects of different pension scheme rules. He considered a 
hypothetical Dutch scheme where the sponsor bears no risk, and analysed redistribution between 
active members, pensioners and future members; and between age cohorts of these three groups. 
Using the same methodology, Hoevenaars and Ponds (2007, 2008), Lekniute (2011) and Draper, 
Van Ewijk, Lever and Mehlkopf (2014) have also illustrated intergenerational redistribution 
among age cohorts arising from changes in scheme rules for hypothetical Dutch pension 
schemes; while Hoevenaars, Kocken and Ponds (2009) and Hoevenaars (2011) have investigated 
redistribution between the sponsor and members (but not between age cohorts of members) for 
hypothetical Dutch DB schemes. Finally, for a hypothetical US state pension scheme, Lekniute, 
Beetsma and Ponds (2014) and Beetsma, Lekniute and Ponds (2014) simulated intergenerational 
redistribution between cohorts of active members and the sponsor (the state’s tax payers) due to 
rule changes. 
 
4. Forecasting Asset Returns, Inflation and Salaries 
In this section we use the Nelson and Siegel (1987) model to estimate the parameters of the yield 
curve for the data period (1993-2010)
7
. We then estimate a VAR(1) model to enable us to 
forecast asset returns, inflation, and the yield curve for the horizon period. Finally we generate 
forecasts of the salaries of the various age cohorts of USS active members until the horizon date. 
In making these forecasts we only use data that would have been available to USS at the time of 
the rule change. 
 
A. Yield Curves. Diebold and Li (2006) have developed a variation of the Nelson-Siegel model 
for forecasting yield curves which allows the entire yield curve to be represented by only three 
parameters.:- 
                                                 
7
 The data we use to estimate the VAR(1) model starts in 1993. This is because earlier data is not 
available for some of the maturities involved in the estimation of the three Nelson-Siegel yield curve 
factors: β1, β2 and β3. The length of the estimation period we use for the VAR(1) model is in line with that 
used by Ferstl and Weissensteiner (2011) and Gulpinar and Pachamanova (2013). 
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where yn(t) denotes the spot rate (zero coupon) at time t for a maturity of n periods, and β1, β2 and 
β3 are the level, slope and curvature respectively of the yield curve. Following Diebold and Li, 
we set the annual decay rate λ in equation (1) to 0.1827. We use end-of-quarter yields from 1993 to 
2010 for zero coupon UK government bonds with maturities of 3 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, 
10 years and 20 years. Following Diebold and Li (2006), who estimate the Nelson-Siegel yield curve 
using data for a 15 year period, we apply linear interpolation to compute the nearby maturities and 
estimate a time series for each of the three parameters in equation (1). These three time series of 
the parameters of the yield curve are then included in a VAR(1) model to generate forecasts of 
the yield curve in future years, (Ferstl and Weissensteiner, 2011).  
 
B. VAR(1) Model. We use a VAR(1) model to generate the future scenarios, as have Hoevenaars 
and Ponds (2008), Hoevenaars, Kocken and Ponds (2009), Hoevenaars, Molenaar and Ponds 
(2010), Hoevenaars (2011), Lekniute (2011), Lekniute, Beetsma, and Ponds (2014). The financial 
data included in our VAR(1) model consists of quarterly excess returns from 1993 to 2010 for 
UK equities (FTSE All Share Total Return index), European equities (MSCI Europe excluding 
the UK Total Return index), US equities (S&P500 Composite Total Return index), hedge funds 
(HFRI Hedge Fund index), commodities (S&P GSCI Total Return index), UK property (UK IPD 
Index Total Return index), together with quarterly values for UK dividends (FTSE All Share 
Dividend Yield), US dividends (S&P500 Composite DS Dividend Yield), and UK inflation rates 
(UK RPI and UK CPI). In addition, we include the three estimated parameters of the Nelson-
Siegel yield curve factors, β1, β2 and β3, in the VAR(1) model in equation (2). 
 
xt+1 = c + Bxt + ζt+1        where ζt+1 ~ N(0, Σ)    (2)  
where xt is a column vector of economic factors at time t, c is a column vector of constants, B is a 
square matrix of coefficients, ζt+1 is a column vector of disturbances at time t+1, and Σ is the 
variance-covariance matrix of the column vector of disturbances. The estimated VAR(1) model 
with 13 variables appears in Table 1, with the estimated covariance matrix of the disturbances in 
 10 
 
Appendix D
8
. The largest eigenvalue of the estimated coefficient matrix (B) is 0.9428, and since 
this is less than one the system is stable and shocks to the system dampen over time. We also 
tried including jumps in the VAR(1) model, but the results were inferior. 
 
Following Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008), Hoevenaars, Kocken and Ponds (2009), Hoevenaars, 
Molenaar and Ponds (2010) and Hoevenaars (2011), we forward iterate this model for the out-of-
sample period to produce 5,000 sets of forecasts (i.e. scenarios) of asset returns, inflation rates, 
and the yield curve until the horizon date
9
. To produce a scenario we generate an x vector at time 
t+1 (x
*
t+1) for each out-of-sample period, where the superscript * indicates a value estimated 
using equation (3).  
x
*
t+1 = c + Bx
*
t + ζ
*
t+1   (3) 
The value of the ζ*t+1 vector each period is generated by Monte Carlo simulation using the 
estimated multivariate normal distribution of the disturbances in equation (2). We computed the 
maximum and minimum yields for each maturity (3 months to 20 years) for the Nelson-Siegel 
yield curves estimated in section 4A. The maximum yield for all maturities is almost flat at 8.5%, 
while the minimum yield rises in a more or less linear manner from 0.4% for 3 months to 3.8% 
for 20 years. When generating future scenarios we impose these upper and lower bounds on the 
forecast yield curves. 
 
C. Salaries. Salaries rise for two reasons - general increases in the salary scale (Ss), and 
incremental pay rises (Si) as active members age or are promoted. The rise in salaries for an age 
cohort of active members is the product of these two sources of wage rises, i.e. (1+Si)(1+Ss). The 
USS scheme actuary estimates general salary increases as the forecast rate of RPI inflation plus 
one percent (USS, 2014). Table E in Higher Education Statistics Agency (2014) provides 
academic salary levels for each age cohort in 2012-13. We use this data to compute the 
relationship between age and salary for UK academics, with the slope of this curve giving the rate 
                                                 
8
 VAR(1) is preferable to VAR(2) according to the Schwarz criterion for model selection. F-tests 
for the regressions of the 13 variables show that one lag is preferable to two lags for ten of the variables. 
For these reasons we prefer the VAR(1) model to the VAR(2) model. All of the 13 variables are 
stationary. None of the sets of regression residuals for the 13 explanatory variables displayed serial 
correlation. Ten of the sets of residuals are normally distributed, with plots of the remaining three sets 
looking approximately normal. 
9
 In a similar context Chen, Pelsser and Ponds (2014) also used 5,000 scenarios. 
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of incremental pay rises for different age cohorts. Together with the RPI inflation forecasts from 
the VAR(1) model, this allows Ss and Si to be forecast until the horizon. USS (2014) gives the 
total pensionable salaries of active members in 2011 as £5.845 billion, and the number of active 
members in 2011 as 139,931. This implies an average salary of £41,771 for USS active members 
in 2011, and we use this to calibrate the cohort salary data from HESA (2014) to match the USS 
active membership average. 
 
5. Forecasting the Size of the Age Cohorts 
The forecasts of the numbers of actives, deferreds and pensioners in each age cohort for the pre 
and post-October 2011 schemes use membership data from the USS annual reports, as well as 
data for 2014 on the size of each age cohort in the final salary and CRB sections supplied directly 
to us by USS. Changes in the total number of active members of USS for the years 1997 to 2014 
are regressed on a time dummy. By modelling the total number of active members we allow for 
early leavers and late joiners. When computing the pension wealth effects of the rule changes on 
each age cohort of active members, we assume they expect to stay in USS until retirement. The 
estimated slope of this regression is zero, with a highly significant constant term of 5,050, 
indicating that USS total active membership is increasing by 5,050 per year. We use the residuals 
from this regression to estimate the standard deviation of annual changes in the total active 
membership of the pre-October 2011 scheme at 2,366. When forecasting the annual increase in 
the total active membership we choose a value at random from a normal distribution and add it to 
the forecast increase to allow for year to year fluctuations. We assume that each year equal 
proportions of the new active members enter the four youngest age cohorts. This assumption is 
chosen to ensure that the average distribution of active members by age cohort across all the 
years until the horizon date approximates the age distribution of active members in 2014 supplied 
to us by USS.  
 
We follow a similar procedure to forecast the annual changes in the number of deferred 
pensioners for the pre and post-October 2011 schemes, except that new deferreds enter with a 
five year lag
10
. In a regression of changes in the total number of deferred pensioners for 1997 to 
2014 on a time dummy the estimated slope coefficient is zero, and the highly significant constant 
                                                 
10
 So we implicitly assume that, on average, deferreds have previously been actives for five years. 
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term is 4,292, with a standard deviation of 1,359. The resulting average age distribution of 
deferred members across all the years until the horizon date approximates the age distribution of 
deferred members in 2014 supplied to us by USS.  
 
6. Forecasting the Liabilities 
We use an actuarial model based on Board and Sutcliffe (2007) and Platanakis and Sutcliffe 
(forthcoming) to forecast the values of the scheme’s liabilities for each age cohort until the 
horizon date, and this requires the specification of a number of parameters, see Appendix B. We 
are modelling the performance and decisions of USS over the horizon period, where the value of 
the liabilities is a key input to computing the funding ratio and revising the contribution rates and 
asset allocation. Therefore, to model the decisions of USS, we need to use the same inputs as 
USS when valuing the liabilities.  
 
We base the life expectancy for each cohort of pensioners on the National Life Tables for the UK, 
2011-13 (ONS, 2014), with the number of members of each pensioner cohort reducing each year 
in accordance with this life table. We generated a blended mortality table using the weights of 
55.5% male and 44.5% female, taken from the HESA (2014) data on the gender of academic 
staff. In 2011 USS members had a blended life expectancy of 25 years at age 65, which 
incorporates the actuary’s estimate of future improvements in USS longevity, USS (2012). As 
USS members have a greater life expectancy than the general population, the national life tables 
are uprated by six years, so that at age 65 USS pensioners are expected to live until they are 90 
years of age. Following Carnes and Olshansky (2007), we do not allow for any further increases 
in longevity over the horizon period. For simplicity, those pensioners who reach the age of 90 
years are assumed to die at the age of 95, which matches their expected longevity of five years at 
the age of 90. 
 
Based on USS (2014) we assume that two thirds of pensioners have an eligible beneficiary 
(usually a spouse) at the time of their death, and that surviving beneficiaries live for another three 
years. During this time eligible beneficiaries receive a pension equal to half that of the deceased 
pensioner. So the extra cost of a spouse’s pension is approximately equal to 0.667×0.5×3 = 1 year 
of the deceased member’s pension. To account for this additional liability, we increase longevity 
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by one year. 
 
The computation of the liabilities also requires estimates of the number of accrued years for each 
age cohort. The age of each cohort is taken as the mid-point of the cohort’s age range, and their 
accrued years are computed from their current age, assuming they joined USS at an average age 
of 32.5 years. We then adjust these numbers in 2011 for each cohort to match the average accrued 
years across all the cohorts of active members of 10.4 years given in USS (2014). On a technical 
provisions basis, the USS liability for deferred pensions in the 2011 actuarial valuation was 
£2.792 billion (USS, 2012). We used equation B.1 in Appendix B to compute the implied number 
of accrued years for deferred pensioners at four years, and adjusted the accrued years for deferred 
members to match the estimated average number of accrued years.  
 
Economic theory indicates that the cash flows in each future year should be discounted using the 
rate of return on a portfolio that replicates the risk and return of this cash flow, leading to the use 
of a different discount rate for each year. However, to model USS decisions on contribution rates 
and asset allocation we need to use the same discount rate as USS, which is the average of the 
current yield curve for the next 20 years plus 1.7%, and so we do likewise, (USS, 2014). 
However, when discounting the cash flows to compute the wealth changes for each cohort and 
the sponsor in section 8, we will use SDFs. Finally the total liabilities computed using our model 
for 2011 were calibrated to equal their value on a USS technical provisions basis of £35.3437 
billion in 2011, with the liabilities for each of the constituent age cohorts correspondingly 
adjusted, (USS, 2012). 
 
The number of people in each cohort was estimated in section 5, and the current salary for the 
members of each cohort is their initial salary increased by the forecasts of salary growth from 
section 4. Our estimates of salary increases follow the USS methodology. Section 4 supplies the 
forecasts of CPI and RPI, and the estimates of the number of members and their salaries in each 
cohort are then calibrated to match the 2011 aggregate numbers published by USS (2014).  
 
In contrast to the Dutch research, because the sponsor remains liable for the pension promise, the 
liabilities for the various cohorts of USS take no account of the overall scheme surplus or deficit. 
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However, in section 8 when computing the future cash flows for pensioners and sponsor, a share 
of the scheme surplus or deficit at the horizon date is allocated to the sponsor.  
 
7. Generating the Cohort Cash Flows 
The cash flows for each cohort per time period are the pensions and lump sums pensioners 
receive, less the contributions active members make to the scheme, while the sponsor just pays 
contributions per time period to the scheme. Contributions to the scheme for each cohort are the 
number of people in the cohort, times the average cohort salary, times the sum of the current 
contribution rates for active members and the sponsor. The size and average salary of each cohort 
were computed in section 4. The contribution rate for members of the final salary section 
increased from 6.35% to 7.5% in October 2011, while the sponsor’s contribution rate remained at 
16%. The members’ contribution rate for the CRB section is 6.5%, and that for the CRB sponsor 
is 16%. The total pension payment to each cohort is the number of people in the cohort times 
their initial pension, adjusted for subsequent limited price indexation, computed using the rules in 
Appendix A. The lump sum calculation for each cohort also follows Appendix A.  
 
The cash flow calculations use the contribution rates and asset allocation for that period, both of 
which can change over time in response to the scheme’s funding ratio. The liabilities were 
estimated in section 6. The total value of the scheme’s assets at the end of each time period is the 
value of the investments at the start of the period, plus asset returns, the contributions received 
from the active members and sponsor during the period, less the lump sums and pensions paid 
out. Asset returns are computed using the forecasts of asset returns in section 4. The USS 
contribution rates and asset allocation are adjusted each period in response to the current value of 
the funding ratio, whose initial value in 2011 was 92% on a technical provisions basis (USS, 
2012). 
 
7A. Adjusting the Contribution Rates. Given the volatility of the funding ratio and the costs of 
change, we only adjust the contribution rates for the final salary and CRB sections when the 
funding ratio is below 90% or above 120%. They are adjusted so as to extinguish any surplus or 
deficit over a 15 year spread period, leading to a funding ratio of unity. For the post-October 
2011 scheme, the difference between the final salary and CRB contribution rates for active 
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members remains fixed at 1%. At the request of USS, Ernst and Young assessed the sponsor’s 
covenant and concluded that the maximum contribution rate the majority of universities can pay 
is 25% (USS, 2014). Given the ‘cap and share’ rule, this implies a member contribution rate of 
10.27% for members of the final salary section, making a total contribution rate of 35.27%. To 
prevent the contribution rate reaching unrealistically high levels, we impose an upper bound of 
35% on the total final salary contribution rate (34% for the CRB section) for both the pre and 
post-October 2011 schemes. We also investigate a maximum contribution rate of 29%, or 
20.275% for the sponsor and 8.725% for members of the final salary section, (28% for the CRB 
section) as a robustness check in section 10.  
 
7B. Adjusting the Asset Allocation. As well as changing the contribution rates in response to the 
funding ratio, the asset allocation may also be altered. There are two rival theories of how a 
scheme’s funding ratio and the probability of default affect its asset allocation. The risk 
management view is that as the probability of default rises, e.g. the funding ratio falls, schemes 
shift out of high risk assets into low risk assets; while the risk shifting view is the opposite
11
. The 
empirical evidence on these rival views is mixed, and so alternative sets of results are generated 
for each of these views. Based on their past volatility, we divide the assets into three groups: high 
risk (UK, European and US equities and commodities), medium risk (real estate and hedge funds) 
and low risk (10 year bonds and cash). Adopting a very simple rule, the difference between the 
current funding ratio and the initial funding ratio in 2011 is used to adjust the money allocated to 
high and low risk assets, subject to the constraints of not allocating more than the available funds, 
or negative funds, to the high and low risk assets. 
 
For example, suppose the initial asset allocation in 2011 is 65% to high risk assets, 15% to 
medium risk assets and 20% to low risk assets; the initial funding ratio in 2011 is 0.80 and that by 
2014 this has risen to 0.95. Using the risk management approach the asset allocation to high risk 
assets rises by (0.95−0.80) = 0.15 to 80%, the allocation to low risk assets drops by a 
                                                 
11
 Addoum, van Binsbergen and Brandt (2010), Amir and Benartzi (1999), An, Huang and Zhang 
(2013), Anantharaman and Lee (2014), Atanasova and Gatev (2013), Bodie, Light, Morck and Taggart 
(1985, 1987), Comprix and Muller (2006), Coronado, Liang and Orszag (2006), Friedman (1983), Guan 
and Lui (2014), LCP (2014), Li (2010), McCarthy and Miles (2013), Mohan and Zhang (2014), Munro 
and Barrie (2003), Petersen (1996) and Rauh (2009).  
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corresponding amount to 5%, and the allocation to medium risk assets is unchanged at 15%. The 
allocations to the individual asset classes within each risk category are rebalanced in proportion 
to the change in the total funds available for that risk category. A similar rule applies for risk 
shifting, except the directions of change are reversed. Therefore we investigate the effects of 
three alternative asset allocation strategies - the actual USS allocation in 2011 in conjunction with 
a fix-mix strategy of rebalancing the asset weights back to the initial allocation every three years, 
risk management and risk shifting. The initial asset allocation in 2011 is UK equities 23.06%, EU 
equities 18.32%, US equities 18.32%, cash 5%, 10-year UK government bonds 12.3%, UK 
property 7%, hedge funds 8%, and commodities 8%. 
 
8. Redistribution  
The objective is to estimate the magnitude of the pension wealth transfer from each cohort of 
scheme members to the sponsor. The NPV of each series of cash flows is computed using risk-
neutral valuation, which has the advantage that it does not require any knowledge of the 
preferences of active members, deferred pensioners, pensioners or the sponsor. For this reason 
SDFs have previously been used to compute the NPVs of pension scheme cash flows by 
Chapman, Gordon and Speed (2001), Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008), Hoevenaars, Kocken and 
Ponds (2009), Hoevenaars, Molenaar and Ponds (2010), Hoevenaars (2011), and Draper, Van 
Ewijk, Lever and Mehlkopf (2014). Lekniute (2011) and Lekniute, Beetsma and Ponds (2014) 
used risk neutral probabilities to value pension cash flows, which is logically equivalent to using 
SDFs. We follow these previous authors in using risk neutral valuation, and use SDFs (or pricing 
kernels) to compute the NPVs of the cash flows for the member and pensioner cohorts and the 
sponsor. 
 
In using SDFs to value the pension liabilities we are treating all the liabilities as potentially risky. 
Although the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) insures roughly 90% of UK DB pension liabilities 
in the event of default, this does not make USS liabilities riskless. Default by USS requires all 
UK universities to be in default, and in such circumstances it is likely that the PPF, which has no 
explicit government guarantee, will also be in default (Blake, Cotter and Dowd, 2007). While 
pensions in payment have priority in the event of default, we have used the same risky discount 
rate for all liabilities. Splitting the liabilities into two tranches does not alter the total default risk, 
 17 
 
although it would lead to slightly higher discount rates for actives and deferreds, and slightly 
lower discount rates for pensioners. However the effects of such an adjustment on the 
conclusions would be minimal. 
 
The use of a unique set of positive SDFs to discount stochastic cash flows relies on the 
assumptions of complete and arbitrage-free markets in which the law of one price applies. Where 
markets exist, competition tends to ensure an absence of arbitrage opportunities and the validity 
of the law of one price. But if markets are incomplete, many alternative sets of positive SDFs 
exist. The valuation of DB pension liabilities faces the problem of a missing market for trading or 
hedging future salaries, and an imperfect market for hedging longevity. This leads to the 
contradiction that the use of risk neutral valuation to value pension scheme liabilities relies on 
complete markets, but if markets were complete pension schemes would lose their reasons for 
existence, e.g. risk sharing, economies of scale, low transactions costs, etc. (McCarthy, 2005). 
 
Our model of USS assumes no cohort longevity risk, leaving only diversifiable longevity risk. 
Since USS has a very large number of members, diversifiable longevity risk is roughly zero, Aro 
(2014), Donnelly (2014). Future salary increases for USS members are split into two 
components: a general uplift in the salary scale which is assumed by USS to be RPI inflation plus 
1%, and a promotional salary increase which is specific to each age cohort. The general RPI-
linked uplift in salaries can be hedged using RPI-linked bonds or RPI-linked swaps, leaving just 
the promotional increases. Our model assumes that, apart from the annual RPI + 1% uplift to all 
scale points, the salary scale remains constant over time, making the average promotional 
increase for each age cohort highly predictable. So, while no instrument exists for trading or 
hedging promotional increases, they are probably low risk, and can more or less be replicated 
using the riskless asset, making the market approximately complete.  
 
Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008), Hoevenaars, Molenaar and Ponds (2010), Hoevenaars (2011) and 
Draper, Van Ewijk, Lever and Mehlkopf (2014) simply assumed zero real wage growth to 
circumvent the incomplete markets problem. This is the same as our model, if promotional salary 
increases are excluded. De Jong (2008) discusses four methods to value salary-indexed stochastic 
future cash flows in the presence of incomplete markets, and advocates utility-based valuation 
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assuming that individuals have a specified utility function. We prefer not to assume utility 
functions for actives, deferreds, pensioners and the sponsor, but to rely on the observed market 
prices used in the SDF computation, recognising that the assumptions required for the use of 
SDFs are not fully met. Pukthuanthong and Roll (2015) have recently found that “the SDF 
theory’s main prediction, that the same SDF prices all assets during the same time period, cannot 
be rejected with our tests, data, or time periods. ... These results are consistent with complete 
markets and an absence of arbitrage.” This empirical finding supports our view that, while the 
assumptions may not be fully met, SDFs are still a useful way of valuing a sequence of risky cash 
flows. As a robustness check, in section 10 we also compute the NPVs using the forecast riskless 
rates, relying on the assumption that USS is backed by the UK university system, and so has 
minimal default risk. Using the riskless interest rate as the discount rate for valuing the liabilities 
of DB schemes is advocated by Broeders, Chen and Rijsbergen (2013), and has the advantage of 
allowing us to estimate the risks attached to expected changes in pension wealth. 
 
If markets are complete, the law of one price applies, and current asset prices are arbitrage free; 
then a unique set of positive state prices exists such that each asset’s current price is the sum of 
the cash flows from the asset in each future state multiplied by the corresponding state price. This 
is the fundamental theorem of asset pricing (see, for instance, Cochrane, 2001), and no 
knowledge of individual preferences is required to compute the state prices. Following Ang, 
Bekaert and Wei (2008) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005); as well as Nijman and Koijen (2006), 
Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008), Hoevenaars, Kocken and Ponds (2009), Hoevenaars, Molenaar 
and Ponds (2010) and Hoevenaars (2011) from the pensions literature, we define SDFs (mt+1) as:- 
    3 T Tt 1 t t t t 1
1
log
2
month
tm y

     ζ           (4) 
where ζt+1 ~ N(0, Σ) denotes a column vector of disturbances from the VAR(1) model, yt
3-month
 is 
the 3 month UK interest rate at time t estimated using the Nelson-Siegel yield curve (see section 
4), and ϕt is a column vector of the time-varying prices of risk which is defined as in Cochrane 
and Piazzesi (2005), see appendix C. SDFs are scenario dependent, and for a given scenario the 
SDF for a cash flow in year k (denoted mt+k
*
) is the product of the SDFs for each of the first k 
years, i.e. mt+k
*
 = mt+1×mt+2×...×mt+k.  
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For every scenario, i.e. each sequence of future returns, salaries, inflation rates, cohort size, and 
contribution rates until the horizon date, we generate annual cash flows. We then discount these 
back to the present using the set of SDFs specific to that cash flow sequence  to get an NPV for 
each cohort. Finally, for each cohort we compute the average NPV across all cash flow sequences 
to place a value on this risky asset. 
 
At the horizon date some age cohorts will still have future cash payments to make or receive, i.e. 
they are pensioners, actives or deferreds. These terminal obligations, which have not yet become 
cash flows, must be valued. Rather than forecast the cash flows until all the new joiners in the 
horizon year have died, i.e. until (2065+70) = 2135, we forecast the cash flows for another 25 
years until 2090. This allows us to compute the subsequent cash flows for all those who are 
pensioners in the horizon year, but not for those who are actives or deferreds. To avoid the 
problem of back-loading we only compute NPVs for cohorts whose members are pensioners or 
deceased at the horizon date, and not for cohorts with active or deferred members. 
 
Given the ‘cap and share’ rule, the terminal surplus or deficit at the horizon date for the post-
October 2011 scheme is shared between the active members and the sponsor. The scheme 
liabilities in 2065 are estimated as the present value in 2065 of the cash flows between 2065 and 
2090 for actives, deferreds and pensioners in 2065, plus the USS valuation using Appendix B of 
the scheme’s liabilities to these actives and deferreds in 209012. Using these liabilities, together 
with the total value of USS assets in 2065, the sponsor is allocated 65% of this horizon year 
surplus or deficit. There is no need to allocate the remaining 35% between the active members at 
the horizon date as the NPVs of their cash flows are not being computed. 
 
For a given set of rules, assumptions and forecasts, the average NPV represents the expected 
increase or decrease in pension wealth in October 2011 for each age cohort from the continued 
operation of USS according to a specified set of rules. We compute the wealth effects of the 
October 2011 rule change by examining differences in the NPVs for the pre and post-October 
2011 schemes. This assumes that each of the alternative scheme designs remains unchanged for 
                                                 
12
 The use of the USS valuation tends to understate the liabilities as it uses a high discount rate. It 
also ignores subsequent investment, salary, inflation, and contribution rate risk. However, since these cash 
flows occur at least 79 years in the future, their discounted value will be relatively small.  
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the horizon period. In the present case, if the pre-October 2011 scheme is not reformed there is an 
increased risk of financial distress for the sponsor, which may then impact on active and future 
members in the form of lower salaries, fewer jobs and subsequent scheme redesign. In common 
with previous studies of the redistributive effects of pension rule changes, we have not valued this 
risk, and assumed that members expect the chosen scheme to be unchanged. 
 
9. Results
13
 
The time series of the forecast mean funding ratios, contribution rates and asset allocations are 
plotted in figures 1 to 6. They are interdependent, as the asset allocation and contribution rates are 
adjusted in response to the current funding ratio. The contribution rates then affect the funding 
ratio in subsequent periods. Cohorts with a mean age of 42 years and older in 2011 contain only 
members of the final salary section, while cohorts aged 22 years and younger in 2011 are all 
members of the CRB scheme. The cohorts initially aged 27, 32 and 37 years contain members of 
both the final salary and the CRB sections.  
 
For the post-October 2011 scheme figure 1 shows that, while the mean funding ratio at first 
declines to below 80%, it steadily recovers. The improvement in the funding ratio from the mid-
2020s onwards is due to the steady shift in the active membership from the final salary section to 
the cheaper CRB section. By 2053 all the active members are in the CRB section and the funding 
ratio has stabilized. At this time the long run funding ratio for fix-mix and risk shifting is over 
115%, and for risk management it is over 100%. Figure 2 indicates that in the long run the pre-
October 2011 scheme has an inadequate funding ratio for risk shifting and fix-mix of about 80%, 
and for risk management it is a disastrous 65%.  
 
The results in figures 3 and 4 for the mean final salary contribution rates lead to broadly similar 
conclusions to those from figures 1 and 2. For the post-October 2011 scheme, after a rise to  29%, 
the total contribution rates for fix-mix and risk shifting steadily decline to a long run rate of 
below 23%, which is less than the 23.5% rate in 2011. The risk management contribution rate 
                                                 
13
 We modelled the problem using Visual Basic for Applications (VBA). On average it takes 50 
seconds to run each scenario on a desktop computer with a 3.2 GHz processor, 12 GB of RAM and 
running in Windows 7 Professional. Therefore it took 17 days of CPU time to run 5,000 scenarios with 
three different asset-allocation strategies and two robustness checks. 
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does not drop below 29% until roughly 2030, and then declines to just below 25%. For the pre-
October 2011 scheme, risk shifting and fix-mix generate a long run contribution rate of around 
27%, and for risk management it is about 30%. These results suggest that the pre-October 2011 
scheme was not viable in the long run, irrespective of the asset allocation strategy adopted. Table 
2 has the means and standard deviations of the funding ratios and contribution rates from 2011 to 
2065. 
 Fix-Mix Risk Mgt. Risk Shifting 
 Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre 
Mean Funding Ratio 98.52% 80.94% 89.17% 70.96% 100.97% 84.23% 
SD of the Funding Ratio 14.66% 5.10% 11.82% 6.80% 15.95% 5.86% 
Mean final salary contribution rate 25.21% 27.09% 26.65% 28.76% 24.80% 26.49% 
SD of the FS contribution rate 2.28% 1.38% 1.94% 1.67% 2.48% 1.44% 
Mean allocation to risky assets 67.70% 67.70% 47.88% 38.38% 62.19% 68.36% 
SD of allocation to risky assets 0.00% 0.00% 8.04% 10.28% 6.37% 1.93% 
Mean allocation to low risk assets 17.30% 17.30% 37.12% 46.62% 22.81% 16.64% 
SD of allocation to low risk assets 0.00% 0.00% 8.04% 10.28% 6.37% 1.93% 
Mean asset return 3.87% 3.87% 2.43% 2.09% 4.23% 4.39% 
SD of asset return 1.76% 1.76% 1.67% 1.68% 1.82% 1.80% 
 
 Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Three Asset Allocation Strategies  
 
Figures 5 and 6 show the very different mean asset allocations for the risk shifting and risk 
management asset allocation strategies. For risk shifting in figure 5, both of the pre and post-
October 2011 schemes retain their high allocation to risky assets and low allocation to low risk 
assets, with the difference being more extreme for the pre-October 2011 scheme
14
. For risk 
management in figure 6 the pre-October 2011 scheme moves to a long run allocation of over 50% 
in low risk assets, and about 35% in risky assets; while the post-October 2011 scheme allocation 
moves to over 50% in risky assets, and about 35% in low risk assets.  
 
Figures 1 to 6 present information on the generation of the cash flows until the horizon date, and 
we can now compute the NPVs of these cash flows for the age cohorts and sponsor. Figure 7 
shows the mean percentage drop in the NPV for each of the age cohorts due to the rule change. 
                                                 
14
 Table 2 shows that for risk shifting the mean post-October 2011 allocation to risky assets 
(62.19%) is lower than for the fix-mix strategy. This is because, when the funding ratio is below its initial 
value of 92%, the risk shifting model seeks to increase the allocation to risky assets. However the risky 
asset proportion cannot rise above 85%, i.e. not more than 17.3% above its opening level of 92%. So if the 
funding ratio drops below 74.7% there can be no further increase in the allocation to risky assets, and this 
lowers the average risky asset proportion so that it is lower than for the fix-mix strategy. 
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There are separate lines for the CRB and final salary sections, which overlap for the 27 to 37 
years cohorts. This shows that young cohorts lose a much higher percentage of their pension 
wealth than do older cohorts, and that CRB members lose much more than do final salary 
members when they are the same age. Future members (cohorts 17 and 22) lose about 65% of 
their pension wealth in 2011, which is the present value of their future cash flows with USS (i.e. 
member contributions, pension and lump sum), while the youngest final salary members lose 
about a quarter of their NPV, and pensioners lose virtually nothing. This difference is because in 
2011 older members had accrued substantial benefits based on contributions made in previous 
years. These benefits are legally protected from the rule change, and so their NPVs do not drop, 
while future members are subject to a much larger NPV drop. In addition, because the NPV 
computation excludes contributions made before 2011 while the accrued benefits these 
contributions created are carried forwards, the NPVs for older members are larger than those for 
younger members. So a given absolute NPV reduction represents a smaller proportionate drop for 
older members.  
 
We converted the proportionate losses per age cohort in figure 7 into approximate losses per head 
in monetary terms for both actives (AL = LY×AY) and deferreds (DL = LY×DY), using equation 
(5) to estimate the mean loss of NPV per accrued year (LY). 
  LY = TL/{TN[AP(AY)+DP(DY)]}           (5) 
where TL is the mean total loss of NPV for the age cohort, TN is the total number of members of 
the age cohort, AP in the proportion of the age cohort who are actives, DP is the proportion of the 
age cohort who are deferreds, AY is the mean number of accrued years at retirement for each 
active member, and DY is the mean number of accrued years at retirement for each deferred 
pensioner. Figure 8 shows the results for the actives and these have a broadly similar shape to 
figure 7, although figure 7 has percentages, and figure 8 has losses in £ per head. Figure 8 shows 
that future active members of the CRB scheme lose about £100,000 per head, while the youngest 
members of the final salary scheme lose £40,000 per head. The corresponding diagram for the 
deferreds has an identical shape to figure 8, but with losses that are (27.5/32.5) = 84.6% lower. 
 
Figure 9 shows the present values of the total loss in £bn. to each cohort of the two sections. The 
total loss in October 2011 to all the cohorts of the final salary section is £3.87 billion, or 12% of 
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the total loss to all cohorts of both sections; and so 88% of the total loss fell on the CRB section. 
The total loss for the age cohorts we have analysed (17 to 92) is £18.0 billion, and the total loss 
for age cohorts -28 to 12 until 2065 is approximately £14.5 billion. 
 
Figure 10 plots the mean percentage drop in the pension received at age 65 for each age cohort. 
Future scheme members experience a drop of about 38% in the pension they will receive at age 
65. Those in the age 42 cohort and older are all in the final salary scheme and will make higher 
contributions post-October 2011, make contributions for an extra one or two years, and draw their 
pension for one or two years less due to an increase in their retirement age. They will also benefit 
from an extra one or two years of additional accrual and salary increases, which will increase 
their pension at retirement. These factors lead to the total loss of £3.87 bn. for active members of 
the final salary scheme shown Figure 9, but none of these factors alter their pension at age 65. As 
figure 10 shows, the pension at age 65 for members of the final salary scheme is unaffected by 
the rule changes. 
 
In addition to estimating the monetary loss to the members of each age cohort, we compute the 
corresponding total monetary gain to the sponsor resulting from the rule change. Since our 
horizon date is 2065, we quantify the gain for the 2011 to 2065 period. This is the present value 
of the reduction in the sponsor’s contributions to USS until 2065 plus the present value of the 
sponsor’s 65% share of the surplus or deficit in that year. The resulting change in NPV for the 
sponsor is a gain of £32.5 billion, equivalent to 26% of their pension cost for the pre-October 
2011 scheme.  
 
10. Robustness Checks 
We have previously studied three alternative asset allocation strategies, and we now investigate 
two additional changes to the base model. So far the sponsor contribution rate for the final salary 
section has been capped at 25%, but some universities would be unhappy with contributing this 
much, and so we investigated capping the sponsor’s contribution rate at just over 20%, to give a 
cap on the total final salary contribution rate of 29% (or 28% for the CRB section). For the post-
October 2011 scheme and the fix-mix strategy, the funding ratio drops to about 75% in the 
medium term, and the final salary contribution rate rises to roughly 26%. In the long run the 
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funding ratio rises to almost 110%, and the final salary contribution rate falls to just above 22%. 
These results suggest that, even if the total contribution rate is capped at 29%, the post-October 
2011 scheme is viable, albeit with an uncomfortable period of low funding before the long run 
equilibrium is reached. 
 
Another robustness check involves replacing the SDFs with the riskless discount rates from the 
VAR(1) model when computing the NPVs. We use riskless rates because USS is backed by the 
UK university system on a last-man-standing basis, making default very unlikely. Figure 11 
shows the expected percentage drop in the NPVs; with broad agreement between the SDF and 
riskless rate estimates of the percentage drop in the NPVs of pension wealth. For example, as for 
SDFs, the drop is 65% for future members. Figure 11 also shows the 10% and 90% percentiles of 
the estimated percentage drop in the NPVs, and these range from about 55% to almost 90% for 
future cohorts, with progressively less variation for older cohorts. Figure 12 shows the mean loss 
in £ per head using the riskless rate. For future members this is about £90,000, compared with 
£100,000 for SDFs, and ranges from £40,000 to £155,000. As before, the loss per head declines 
rapidly with age, and is markedly lower for members of the final salary section. 
 
Using the riskless rates, the sponsor’s total gain for the 2011-2065 period is £30.0 billion, 
compared to £32.5 billion using SDFs, with a 10% percentile of £10.5 billion, and a 90% 
percentile of £55.7 billion. As for SDFs, the sponsor’s total gain using riskless rates is 26% of 
their costs for the pre-October 2011 scheme. The total loss for the cohorts aged 17 to 92 is £16.1 
billion for riskless rates (compared with £18.0 billion when using SDFs), with 10% and 90% 
percentiles of £6.6 billion and £27.5 billion respectively; while the total loss for the -28 to 12 
cohorts is £13.8 billion (compared with £14.5 billion when using SDFs). Therefore the use of 
riskless rates to discount the cash flows rather than SDFs, supports the general conclusions 
reached using SDFs. 
 
Finally Figure 13 compares the riskiness (coefficient of variation) of the NPVs computed using 
riskless rates before and after the rule change. For the younger members of the final salary 
scheme in October 2011 there is a modest increase in the coefficient of variation of their NPVs 
with the move to the new scheme, but no change for the older members and pensioners. For 
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future members in 2011 the riskiness of their pension wealth increases by about one third, relative 
to the risks they would have faced if they had joined the old final salary scheme. The October 
2011 rule changes reduce the coefficient of variation for the sponsor by about 10%. 
 
11. Conclusions  
For members close to retirement the value of their pension wealth may be their largest single 
asset. So changes in a scheme’s rules can have an important effect on a member’s total wealth. 
When redesigning DB pension schemes, modelling the long run effects on the sponsor and 
members is generally neglected. What is needed is a dynamic long-term model that incorporates 
the interactions between the funding ratio, contribution rate, asset allocation and asset returns, as 
well as the differential effects on the various age cohorts. This research has built and estimated 
such a model for the USS rule change in October 2011. Although we modelled all the rules that  
changed, as well as other important rules, the complexity of the problem necessitates ignoring 
inconsequential rules. It also requires making heroic forecasts of asset returns, salaries, numbers 
of members and inflation far into the future. The actual situation of USS in 2065 will inevitably 
be substantially different from the mean forecast of our model, but since pension schemes have 
very distant horizons, such long term forecasts are necessary when analysing the effects of a rule 
change. Therefore the model can only give broad indications, rather than precise estimates. 
However, when comparing two alternative sets of rules using exactly the same model and 
forecasts, we have a level playing field. 
 
This is the first such study for a real scheme (USS), and also the first where the sponsor bears all 
or part of the risk, e.g. ‘balance of cost’ or ‘cap and share’. It is also the first to incorporate a 
range of real world pension scheme features - lump sums, deferred pensioners, limited price 
indexation, spouses’ pensions, an increase in the retirement age, two sections (final salary and 
CARE), ‘cap and share’ contribution rates, and an uncertain number of new members each year. 
It also examines three different asset allocation strategies - fix-mix, risk shifting and risk 
management - over a 54 year out-of-sample period, which is long enough to avoid the back-
loading problem. This has the advantage that none of the actives in 2011 are still active in 2065, 
allowing the scheme to reach a new equilibrium by the horizon date.   
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For both schemes the performance of the risk shifting and fix-mix asset allocation strategies is 
similar, mainly because fix-mix involves a substantial allocation to risky assets, and both 
strategies are clearly superior to risk management. The results indicate that in the long run the 
pre-October 2011 scheme was not viable. Using the two best asset allocation strategies (risk 
shifting and fix-mix) the long run funding ratio would be about 80%, and the contribution rate for 
the final salary scheme around 27%. For the risk management strategy the long run outcomes are 
markedly worse - a long run funding ratio of 65% and a contribution rate of 30%. The post-
October 2011 scheme appears reasonably viable in the long run for the two best asset allocation 
strategies, with a funding ratio above 115% and a final salary contribution rate of about 23%, 
which is slightly below the 2011 rate of 23.5%. However, before this long run state is reached, 
the post-October 2011 scheme experiences funding ratios of 80% and contribution rates of about 
29%, which would be problematic.  
 
So the decision to redesign USS in October 2011 was justified, creating a post-October 2011 
scheme that appears to be sustainable in the long run, although with medium term difficulties that 
are gradually solved as the active membership switches from the final salary section to the 
cheaper CRB section. These results indicate that a further redesign of USS is needed in the 
medium term to cope with progressively higher contribution rates and lower funding ratios
15
. 
However, in the long run, when all the active members are in the cheaper CRB section, USS will 
become a well-funded scheme with a total contribution rate just above the pre-October 2011 
value of 22.35%. Subsequent rule changes to deal with the medium term problems will only 
increase the long run strength of USS. The robustness checks broadly support these conclusions. 
 
The rule change in October 2011 resulted in the transfer of about £32.5 billion of wealth from the 
members to the sponsor during the 2011 to 2065 period. This is equivalent to about £600 million 
per year, or over 60% of the sponsor’s contribution in 2011 of £938.4 million. The reduction in 
                                                 
15
 Error! Main Document Only.In 2014 USS decided to reduce the riskiness of its 
investments, so that the expected return drops by three basis points each year for the next 20 years, i.e. a 
total reduction of 60 basis points (USS, 2014). In April 2016 there was another major rule change - the 
final salary section was closed to future accruals and the CRB section offered to these members. 
Contribution rates to the CRB scheme increased to 8% for members and 18% for the sponsor, i.e. 26% in 
total. Pensionable salary for the CRB section was capped (initially £55,000), with earnings above this cap 
eligible for a new defined contribution section. 
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the present value in 2011 of the sponsor’s pension contributions over this period is 26% using 
either SDFs or riskless rates. The cost of this wealth transfer is very unevenly distributed across 
the various age cohorts and sections, with the burden rising from near zero for pensioners and 
those close to retirement in 2011, to about 65% of their pension wealth for future members. Since 
pensions are deferred pay, this represents a substantial pay cut. Before the October 2011 rule 
change the total annual contributions to the scheme were 22.35% of salaries, but the above 
analysis suggests that the long run annual cost of providing this scheme was closer to 27% of 
salaries, of which 6.35% was paid by the members from their salaries, leaving 20.65% to be paid 
by the sponsor of this ‘balance of cost’ scheme. We have estimated that future members have 
experienced a drop in their pension wealth of 65%, which is equivalent to a drop of 
approximately 0.65×0.2065/1.2065 ≈ 11% in their total compensation, or 0.65×0.2065 = 13% in 
their salaries.  
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Appendix A - USS Rules Pre and Post-October 2011 
The final salary section was closed to new members in October 2011, but remains open for 
accruals by existing members, while the CRB section has been open to new members and 
accruals since October 2011.  
Rules that Changed in October 2011 
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1 Contribution Rate - Final Salary. The contribution rate for active members of the final salary 
section increased from 6.35% to 7.5%. 
2 Contribution Rate – ‘Cap and Share’. Before October 2011 USS was a ‘balance of cost’ 
scheme, where the sponsor is ultimately responsible for meeting the pensions promise. Post-
October 2011 for both the final salary and CRB sections, any increase in the contribution rate is 
shared between the sponsor and active members in the proportions 65% to the sponsor and 35% 
to the members. If there is a large surplus, contribution rates are reduced in the same proportions.  
3 Inflation Indexation for Pensions in Payment. Until April 2011 RPI was used to fully uprate 
USS pensions in payment and deferred pensions, but the government changed this to CPI in April 
2011. So before October 2011 there was full indexation of pensions in payment using CPI. Post-
October 2011 for both the final salary and CRB sections if inflation, as measured by the CPI, is 
less than 5% there is full indexation. For inflation between 5% and 15% indexation is 5% plus 
half of the excess over 5%. If inflation is more than 15% indexation is capped at 10%. In periods 
of negative inflation pensions are not reduced, but no increase is applied. Benefits accrued before 
October 2011 in the final salary section increase fully in line with official pensions, i.e. uncapped 
CPI.  
4 Up-rating of the Accrued Benefits of Deferred Pensioners. Before October 2011 there was no 
cap on the up-rating of the accrued benefits of deferred pensioners. After the rule change in 
October 2011 the accrued benefits of deferred pensioners are uprated by CPI, capped at 2.5%.  
5 Normal Retirement Age (NRA). Before October 2011 the NRA was 65 years. In October 2011 
this was changed so that the USS NRA for the final salary and CRB sections increases with the 
state retirement age. This will rise to 66 years in about 2020, 67 years in about 2028, and 68 in 
about 2046.  
Some Other Rules Which Did Not Change in October 2011 
6 Accrual Factor. For both the final salary and CRB sections the accrual rate is 1/80
th
 plus a lump 
sum of three times the pension. Using a commutation factor of 1:16 to convert the lump sum into 
a pension, the accrual factor including the lump sum is 1/67.37 for both sections.  
7 Lump Sum. On retirement, pensioners can choose to take up to 25% of the value of their 
pension as a tax free lump sum. Pensioners are assumed to follow the USS default and take three 
times the annual value of their pension as a lump sum. Their subsequent pension payments are 
then based on an accrual factor of 1/80
ths
, rather than 1/67.37
ths
. 
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8 Revaluation Rate for the CRB Section. The revaluation rate used to uprate the average salary for 
active members of the CRB section each year to allow for inflation is the same as the inflation 
rate used to up-rate pensions in payment. 
9 Pensionable Salary for the Final Salary Section. The pensionable final salary is the greater of:- 
(a) the member's highest salary for any period of 12 complete months ending on the last day of a 
month during the last three years before retirement, and (b) the highest yearly average of the total 
salary of the member for any three consecutive years ending at the end of any month within the 
last ten years before retirement. Both amounts are increased, except for the last year before 
retirement, in proportion to any increase in the RPI between that published at the last day of the 
relevant year and that published at retirement. 
10 Spouses Pensions. When a pensioner dies their spouse, civil partner or dependant partner 
(regardless of sex) receives a pension for life. The spouse’s or civil partner’s pension is 1/160th 
times pensionable salary at retirement times pensionable service at retirement, plus pension 
increases from retirement to death. Note that this calculation ignores the actual lump sum chosen 
by the pensioner, and assumes they took the standard amount of three times their initial pension.  
 
Appendix B.1. Final Salary (FS) Scheme 
The actuarial liability for active and deferred members of the cohort x at time t is given by:- 
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 
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       (B.1) 
where A is the accrual rate (constant), 
           x,FS
A/D,t
h   is the annual nominal discount rate at time t, 
           x,FS
A/D,t
R  is the forecast retirement age of the active/deferred members in cohort x   
                     at time t, 
           x,FS
A/D,t
G  is the average age of the active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t, 
 x,FS
A/D,t
W  is the life expectancy at retirement of the active/deferred members in cohort   
                     x  at time t, 
            x,FS
A/D,t
p  is the annual rate of growth of the price level at time t, 
            x,FS
A/D,t
P  is the past years of service of active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,FS
A/D,t
S  is the annual salary of the active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,FS
A/D,t
e  is the expected nominal rate of salary growth per annum between time t   
                     and retirement of the active/deferred members in cohort x , 
           x,FS
A/D,t
N  is the number of the active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t. 
 
The actuarial liability for pensioners in cohort x at time t is given by:- 
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                                                            (B.2) 
where x,FS
P,t
N  is the number of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,FS
P,t
PEN  is the annual pension of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,FS
P,t
p  is the annual rate of growth of the price level at time t, 
            x,FS
P,t
h  is the annual nominal discount rate at time t, 
            x,FS
P,t
q  is the life expectancy of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t. 
 
The total actuarial liability of the FS scheme is given by:- 
 FS, Total x,FS x,FS x,FSt A,t D,t P,tL = L +L +L
x 
                                                                                                   (B.3) 
Appendix B.2. Career Revalued Benefit (CRB) Scheme  
 
The actuarial liability for active and deferred members in cohort x at time t is given by:- 
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where A is the accrual rate (constant), 
            x,CRB
A/D,t
h    is the annual nominal discount rate at time t, 
            x,CRB
A/D,t
R   is the forecast retirement age of the active/deferred members in cohort x    
                       at time t, 
            x,CRB
A/D,t
G   is the average age of the active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,CRB
A/D,t
W  is the life expectancy at retirement of the active/deferred members in cohort   
                      x  at time t, 
           x,CRB
A/D,t
p    is the annual rate of growth of the price level at time t, 
           x,CRB
A/D,t
P    is the past years of service of active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t, 
x,CRB
A/D,t
S    is the average annual revalued earnings of the active/deferred members in cohort 
          x  at time t , 
           x,CRB
A/D,t
e   is the expected nominal rate of salary growth per annum between time t   
                      and retirement of the active/deferred members in cohort x , 
           x,CRB
A/D,t
N  is the number of the active/deferred members in cohort x  at time t. 
 
The actuarial liability for the pensioners in cohort x at time t is given by:- 
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P,t-qx,CRB x,CRB
P,t P,tx,CRB x,CRB x,CRB
P,t P,t P,t x,CRB x,CRB
P,t P,t
1+ h 1+ h
L = N × PEN × 1 1
1+ p 1+ p
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                                                (B.5) 
where x,CRB
P,t
N  is the number of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,CRB
P,t
PEN  is the annual pension of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t, 
            x,CRB
P,t
p  is the annual rate of growth of the price level at time t, 
            x,CRB
P,t
h  is the annual nominal discount rate at time t, 
            x,CRB
P,t
q  is the life expectancy of the pensioners in cohort x  at time t. 
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Finally, the total actuarial liability of the CRB scheme is given by:- 
 CRB, Total x,CRB x,CRB x,CRBt A,t D,t P,tL = L +L +L
x 
                                                                                          (B.6) 
 
Appendix C. Time Varying Price of Risk 
 
Following Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005, equation 8) and other studies, we compute the column 
vector ϕt for equation (4) using the following expression:- 
  1 1
t
1
( )
2
diag 
 
   
 
c Bx  φt
         (C.1) 
If investors are risk neutral, an absence of arbitrage opportunities requires the spot rate expected 
next period to equal the implied forward rate for next period. Following Hoevenaars (2011), 
Hoevenaars, Molenaar and Ponds (2010), and Hoevenaars and Ponds (2008), we set the implied 
forward interest rate next period (t+1) (i.e. the first two right hand terms in equation 4) equal to 
the spot interest rate for next period from the VAR(1) model. The parameters Σ and B come from 
the VAR(1) model in equation (2), while the column vector xt contains the state variables of the 
VAR(1) model at time t.  
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Fig. 1: Post-October 2011 Scheme Mean Funding Ratios for the Three Asset Allocation 
Strategies 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Pre-October 2011 Scheme Mean Funding Ratios for the Three Asset Allocation Strategies 
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Fig. 3: Post-October 2011 Mean Contribution Rates for the Three Asset Allocation Strategies 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Pre-October 2011 Mean Contribution Rates for the Three Asset Allocation Strategies 
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Fig. 5: Mean Risk Shifting Asset Allocation for the Pre and Post-October 2011 Schemes 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6: Mean Risk Management Asset Allocation for the Pre and Post-October 2011 Schemes 
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Fig. 7: Percentage Drop in the NPV for Each Age Cohort Due to the Rule Change Using SDF 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8: £s Loss Per Head for Actives in Each Age Cohort Using SDF 
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Fig. 9: Losses Per Age Cohort in £bn. Using SDF 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10: Mean Percentage Drop Per Head for Actives in Pension Received at Age 65. 
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Fig. 11: Mean Percentage Drop in the NPV for Each Age Cohort Due to the Rule Change Using  
Riskless Rates 
 
 
 
Fig. 12: Mean £s Expected Loss Per Head for Actives in Each Age Cohort Using Riskless Rates 
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Fig. 13: Coefficient of Variation of the NPVs of the Pre and Post-October 2011 Schemes Using 
Riskless Rates 
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 Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
UK Equities EU Equities US Equities β1 β2 β3 RPI CPI US Div. Yield UK Div. 
Yield 
Real Estate Hedge Funds Commodities 
UK Equities−1 −0.3612 −0.1091 −0.1422 −0.0018 0.0109 0.0214 0.0195 0.0139 0.0039 −0.0034 −0.0286 −0.0981 −0.3404 
EU Equities−1 −0.0713 −0.2966 −0.0390 −0.0014 0.0046 −0.0118 0.0130 0.0100 0.0016 0.0053 0.0288 0.0035 −0.0884 
US Equities−1 0.4112 0.2087 0.0848 −0.0009 −0.0028 −0.0206 −0.0119 −0.0054 −0.0029 0.0001 −0.0086 0.0867 0.3040 
β1−1 −0.4952 −0.7877 0.0688 0.9448*** 0.0285 0.2721 −0.0002 0.0120 −0.0059 0.0057 −0.3170 −0.4678 −0.9858 
β2−1 1.4921 2.3739** 1.0690 0.0280 0.8903*** 0.1488 −0.0556 −0.0452 −0.0212 −0.0685** −0.3659 −0.2860 −1.8285 
β3−1 0.1642 1.0112* 0.4500 0.0032 0.1225*** 0.7355*** 0.0095 −0.0481 −0.0148* −0.0136 −0.1362 0.3279 0.4958 
RPI−1 −2.4706 2.1284 0.2694 −0.1250 0.6941** −1.0608 0.4349 0.1389 0.0375 −0.0509 −1.0724 −2.7645 0.6554 
CPI−1 2.3009 −1.5969 1.6955 −0.0677 −0.3465 −0.1462 −0.8695** −0.5552** −0.0547 0.0524 0.6412 3.1756 −0.2533 
US Div. Yield−1 −2.2987 −0.0907 −6.4177 0.5929** −0.7719* 0.6549 0.7525* 0.8630** 1.1043*** 0.4032** −3.0353** −3.2437 3.2957 
UK Div. Yield−1 8.5757** 11.1708** 10.2069** −0.2728 0.5048* −0.7728 −0.4421 −0.5186** −0.1840** 0.4519*** 2.0274* 3.9016* −6.2207 
Real Estate−1 1.3405*** 1.6201*** 1.2460*** 0.0227 −0.0048 0.13058 0.0093 −0.0228 −0.0191*** −0.0335*** 0.7855*** 0.5234*** −0.1845 
Hedge Funds−1 0.0461 0.3166 −0.0197 −0.0008 −0.0126 0.0248 −0.0070 −0.0119 −0.0026 −0.0137 0.0670 0.0706 0.9494* 
Commodities−1 −0.0569 −0.1527 −0.1455 0.0033 −0.0054 −0.0162 0.0028 0.0058 0.0027 0.0043 −0.0617** −0.0368 −0.0026 
Constant −0.1815** −0.2814*** −0.2174*** 0.0023 −0.0080 0.0098 0.0089 0.0064 0.0037*** 0.0083*** 0.0033 −0.0467 0.1586 
R2 0.3274 0.3435 0.3005 0.9543 0.9268 0.6950 0.3788 0.3488 0.9246 0.8813 0.7435 0.3276 0.2002 
Adj. R2 0.1740 0.1938 0.1410 0.9438 0.9101 0.6255 0.2372 0.2003 0.9074 0.8543 0.6850 0.1743 0.0178 
F statistic 2.1339 2.2941 1.8840 91.4837 55.4779 9.9930 2.6740 2.3484 53.7874 32.5666 12.7083 2.1364 1.0976 
 
 Table 1: VAR(1) Model Used to Generate the Forecasts 
 
 ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
  
  
1 
 
 
   UK Equities EU Equities US Equities β1 β2 β3 RPI CPI US Div. Yield UK Div. Yield Real Estate Hedge Funds Commodities 
  UK Equities 0.004450 0.004534 0.004095 0.000034 -0.000011 0.000173 0.000046 0.000004 -0.000067 -0.000131 0.000318 0.001792 0.001023 
  EU Equities 0.004534 0.006844 0.004626 0.000039 0.000007 0.000181 0.000076 -0.000012 -0.000079 -0.000132 0.000427 0.002192 0.001609 
  US Equities 0.004095 0.004626 0.004966 0.000031 0.000005 0.000140 0.000090 0.000021 -0.000082 -0.000117 0.000155 0.001773 0.001213 
  β1 0.000034 0.000039 0.000031 0.000010 -0.000013 0.000023 -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000000 -0.000001 0.000006 0.000017 0.000052 
  β2 -0.000011 0.000007 0.000005 -0.000013 0.000026 -0.000042 0.000006 0.000002 -0.000001 0.000002 -0.000007 -0.000001 0.000047 
  β3 0.000173 0.000181 0.000140 0.000023 -0.000042 0.000227 -0.000004 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000005 0.000115 0.000121 0.000038 
  RPI 0.000046 0.000076 0.000090 -0.000000 0.000006 -0.000004 0.000029 0.000021 -0.000002 0.000002 0.000003 0.000051 0.000277 
  CPI 0.000004 -0.000012 0.000021 -0.000000 0.000002 -0.000001 0.000021 0.000020 -0.000001 0.000003 -0.000005 0.000014 0.000209 
  US Div. Yield -0.000067 -0.000079 -0.000082 -0.000000 -0.000001 -0.000002 -0.000002 -0.000001 0.000002 0.000002 -0.000006 -0.000031 -0.000032 
  UK Div. Yield -0.000131 -0.000132 -0.000117 -0.000001 0.000002 -0.000005 0.000002 0.000003 0.000002 0.000005 -0.000015 -0.000048 0.000038 
  Real Estate 0.000318 0.000427 0.000155 0.000006 -0.000007 0.000115 0.000003 -0.000005 -0.000006 -0.000015 0.000390 0.000225 0.000364 
  Hedge Funds 0.001792 0.002192 0.001773 0.000017 -0.000001 0.000121 0.000051 0.000014 -0.000031 -0.000048 0.000225 0.001424 0.001159 
  Commodities 0.001023 0.001609 0.001213 0.000052 0.000047 0.000038 0.000277 0.000209 -0.000032 0.000038 0.000364 0.001159 0.011842 
 
Appendix D: Covariance Matrix of the VAR(1) Model Residuals 
